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I. INTRODUCTION 
What happens when you combine technology, raging adolescent hormones, and 
rash decisions?  As we have seen these past few years, one outcome is 
“sexting”―the trend of teenagers transmitting sexually suggestive text messages or 
photographs through cell phones and similar communication devices.  In 2009, the 
media was saturated with stories pertaining to sexting, from discussing the 
ramifications of engaging in itincluding cyber bullying,1 slashed reputations,2 and 
serious criminal charges3to providing guidelines for what parents and educators 
could do to control or prevent it.4  Though sexting includes the transmission of 
messages as well as photographs, the majority of media coverage pertains to the 
latter, and thus, photos will be the focus of this Note. 
The flurry of attention that sexting has received is mostly due to the controversy 
emanating from the prosecutorial discretion in various states to charge teenagers5 
engaging in sexting under laws generally reserved for producers and distributors of 
child pornography.  Such discretion has resulted in teens facing grave consequences 
that affect the rest of their lives.  Teenagers prosecuted for sexting have faced, 
                                                          
 
1
 Mike Celizic, Her Teen Committed Suicide Over ‘Sexting,’ TODAY (Mar. 6, 2009), 
http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/29546030/. 
 
2
 Marcia Hall, Sexting: A Way to Ruin Your Reputation, REPUTATION COUNTS (Apr. 2, 
2009), http://www.reputationcounts.com/blog/?p=196. 
 
3
 Deborah Feyerick & Sheila Steffen, ‘Sexting’ Lands Teen On Sex Offender List, CNN 
(Apr. 8, 2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/04/07/sexting.busts/index.html; Donna St. 
George, Sending of Explicit Photos Can Land Teens in Legal Fix, WASH. POST, May 7, 2009, 
at A01; Sexting Girls Facing Porn Charge Sue D.A., CBS NEWS (Mar. 27 2009), http://www. 
cbsnews.com/stories/2009/03/27/early-show/main4896577.shtml; Teens Face Child Porn 
Charge in Sexting Incident, NEWS 5-WLWT (Apr. 8, 2009), http://www.wlwt.com/news/191 
20685/detail.html.  
 
4
 The Ind. Youth Inst., Teen “Textuality” Youth Sexting: A Troubling New Trend, 4-5 
(Aug. 2009), http://www.iyi.org/resources/doc/Issue-Brief-SEXTING-Aug09.pdf. 
 
5
 “Teenagers” and “teens” in this Note refer to minors between thirteen and seventeen 
years old as a twelve year old falls in the younger pre-teen category commonly known as 
“tweens,” while a person who is eighteen is considered an adult.  See Media Awareness 
Network, Special Issues for Tweens and Teens: The “Tween Market,” http://www.media-
awareness.ca/english/parents/marketing/issues_teens_marketing.cfm (last visited March 20, 
2010) (defining “tweens” as eight to twelve year olds).   
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among other things, the possibility of being imprisoned or being required to register 
as sex offenders for as many as twenty-five years for conduct that they perceived as 
innocent6―a modern form of flirting, so to speak.  The punishment simply does not 
fit the crime.   
As a result, several states have proposed legislation specific to sexting.7  In Ohio, 
House Bill 132 (“H.B. 132”) proposes punishing sexting as a misdemeanor.8  This 
Note will explain that, considering policy reasons, taking teen sexting out of child 
pornography laws’ scope is a step in the right direction.  Nonetheless, the Bill may 
face opposition ahead for two reasons.   
First, the Bill is an overly broad restriction on minors’ sexual expression, a form 
of speech protected under the First Amendment.  While the scope of the Bill 
encompasses images that could fall under Ohio’s definition of child pornography, it 
also covers images that would not.9  Images that are neither obscene nor child 
pornography are a constitutionally protected form of free speech.10  In abridging a 
fundamental constitutional right, H.B. 132 should be narrowly constructed to restrict 
the right in the least restrictive means while furthering the intended state interest.11  
Because H.B. 132 is not narrowly constructed, in that it proposes to restrict all forms 
of sexting, the Bill does not pass constitutional scrutiny. 
Second, the Bill may be challenged as an unconstitutional infringement on 
parents’ due process right under the Fourteenth Amendment to raise their children 
free from governmental interference.  Again, for such a law to be valid, it must be 
justified by a compelling state interest and it must be narrowly tailored to attain that 
interest by the least restrictive means possible.12  Because parents may be able to 
prevent their children from sexting without state interference, the criminal sanctions 
that would be imposed on children if H.B. 132 were enacted may be an unnecessary 
and, therefore, unconstitutional restriction on parental rights. 
To illustrate the benefits and shortcomings of the proposed legislation, Part II 
provides a background on sexting, including the different forms it may take, as well 
as prosecutors’ overwhelming response of charging sexting teens under child 
pornography laws in the past two years.  Part III discusses the policy reasons and 
compelling state interests that justify enacting child pornography laws.  Part IV then 
explains how prosecuting sexting under child pornography laws is like fitting a 
square peg in a round hole: though some forms of sexting may fit the black-letter law 
                                                          
 
6
 A violation under 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6312 (2009), for example, constitutes a felony 
that could result in long prison terms and a permanent record.  See Miller v. Skumanick, 605 
F. Supp. 2d 634, 638 (M.D. Pa. 2009).  Furthermore, if convicted, teens would likely have to 
register as sex offenders for at least ten years under Pennsylvania’s Registration of Sexual 
Offenders Act.  Id. (citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9791). 
 
7
 2009 “Sexting” Legislation, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGS. (Sept. 1, 2010), 
http://www.ncsl.org/?tabid=17756. 
 
8
 H.B. 132, 128th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2009-2010), available at 
http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/bills.cfm?ID=128_HB_132. 
 
9
 See infra note 172 and accompanying text. 
 
10
 See infra notes 130-31 and accompanying text. 
 
11
 See infra notes 205-08 and accompanying text. 
 
12
 See infra notes 208, 210 and accompanying text. 
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2010
688 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:685 
 
of child pornography statutes, prosecuting it under these laws is improper based on 
the policy reasons.  Next, Part V discusses the enactment of new legislation as one 
solution to the sexting dilemma that is being contemplated in Ohio.  Because the 
scope of the proposed law includes conduct that is neither child pornography nor 
obscenity, this Part sets out to analyze other compelling state interests that may 
justify the law.   Finally, Part VI explains that the Bill’s overly broad scope make it 
an unconstitutional infringement on teens’ freedom of expression and an 
encroachment on parents’ authority to control the conduct and upbringing of their 
children.  
II.  WHAT IS SEXTING AND WHAT HAS BEEN DONE ABOUT IT? 
A.  Prevalence 
Sexting, the transmitting of sexually suggestive text messages or photographs 
through cell phones and similar communication devices, has emerged as a 
phenomenon in middle schools and high schools during the past two years.13  
Because an overwhelming majority of teens own cell phones has undoubtedly 
contributed to the spread of this trend.14  Though some may argue that like all trends, 
sexting may “evaporate[] over time,”15 others worry that “‘[t]he technology is there, 
and unless the technology is going away, the behavior is not going away.’”16  
Thus far, there has been a limited amount of research conducted on sexting.  In 
the fall of 2008, the National Campaign to Prevent Teen and Unplanned 
Pregnancy,17 together with CosmoGirl.com,18 released its groundbreaking study, Sex 
and Tech: Results from a Survey of Teens and Young Adults.19  The study reported 
that 19% of teens ages thirteen to nineteen who participated in the survey said they 
                                                          
 
13
 Donna St. George, Sexting Hasn’t Reached Most Young Teens, Poll Finds; 30% of 17-
Year-Olds Report Getting Nude Photos on Their Cells, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2009, at A12, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/15/AR2009 
121502321.html?sub=AR.  
 
14
 Id. 
 
15
 Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, When Sex and Cell Phones Collide: Inside the 
Prosecution of a Teen Sexting Case, 32 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 38 (2009). 
 
16
 St. George, supra note 13 (quoting Sgt. Bill Fulton, Fairfax Cnty. Police Dep’t). 
 
17
 The National Campaign to Prevent Teen and Unplanned Pregnancy is a “private, non-
profit, non-partisan organization that seeks to improve the lives and future prospects of 
children and families.”  Press Release, The Nat’l Campaign to Prevent Teen & Unplanned 
Pregnancy & CosmoGirl.com, The National Campaign to Prevent Teen and Unplanned 
Pregnancy and CosmoGirl.com Reveal Results of Sex & Tech Survey: Large Percentage of 
Teens Posting/Sending Nude/Semi Nude Images, available at http://www.thenational 
campaign.org/sextech/PDF/SexTech_PressReleaseFIN.pdf (last visited Jan. 7, 2011)  
 
18
 “CosmoGirl.com is a part of Hearst Magazines Digital Media, launched in March 2006, 
and a unit of Hearst Magazines.”  Id.  It aspires to “empower[] and inspire[] young women to 
be leaders in all aspects of their lives.”  Id. 
 
19
 Sex and Tech: Results from a Survey of Teens and Young Adults, THE NAT’L CAMPAIGN 
TO PREVENT TEEN AND UNPLANNED PREGNANCY & COSMOGIRL.COM (2008), 
http://www.thenationalcampaign.org/sextech/PDF/SexTech_Summary.pdf [hereinafter Sex 
and Tech] (last visited Jan. 7, 2011). 
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had sent a sexually suggestive picture or video of themselves to someone via email, 
cell phone, or some other means, while 31% said that they had received a nude or 
semi-nude picture from someone else.20  Not surprisingly, the study caught the 
public’s attention, and with no other studies reported at the time, the shocking 
statistics about sexting spread like wild fire throughout the media in early 2009.21   
Additional studies have been conducted since Sex and Tech.22  Notably, these 
studies show that the vast majority of teens have never sent or received sexually 
suggestive photos or videos.  In May of 2009, Cox Communications,23 partnered 
with the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children24 and John Walsh,25 
published a study revealing that only 9% of teens ages thirteen to eighteen had sent a 
sexually suggestive text message or email with nude or nearly-nude photos, while 
17% had received such a text message or email.26  In September of 2009, MTV,27 in 
partnership with the Associated Press,28 released findings from an online survey that 
only 10% of young adults ages fourteen to twenty-four have shared a naked image of 
themselves with someone else, and 18% have had someone send them naked pictures 
                                                          
 
20
 Id. at 11. 
 
21
 See sources cited supra note 3. 
 
22
 See infra notes 26, 29 & 31. 
 
23
 Cox Communications is a multi-service broadband communications and entertainment 
company.  Press Release, Take Charge!, Cox’s New Survey on Cyber-Safety Finds Many 
Teens Going Online Wirelessly Without Limits or Controls (May 14, 2009), available at 
http://www.cox.com/TakeCharge/pr_05_09_14.asp.  In 2004, Cox Communications launched 
its Take Charge! program “to educate parents and guardians about the importance of Internet 
safety and to help families get the most out of mass media in the home.”  Id. 
 
24
 The National Center for Missing & Exploited Children (NCMEC) “was established in 
1984 as a private, nonprofit 501(c)(3) organization to provide services nationwide for families 
and professionals in the prevention of abducted, endangered, and sexually exploited children.”  
National Mandate and Mission, NAT’L CTR. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN, 
http://www.missingkids.com/missingkids/servlet/PageServlet?LanguageCountry=en_US&Pag
eId=1866 (last visited Jan. 7, 2011). 
 
25
 John Walsh is America’s Most Wanted host and a children’s safety advocate.  Press 
Release, Take Charge!, supra note 23.  
 
26
 Teen Online & Wireless Safety Survey: Cyberbullying, Sexting, and Parental Controls, 
COX COMMC’NS TEEN ONLINE & WIRELESS SAFETY SURVEY, IN P’SHIP WITH THE NAT’L CTR. 
FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN (NCMEC) & JOHN WALSH (May 2009), 
http://www.cox.com/takecharge/safe_teens_2009/media/2009_teen_survey_internet_and_wire
less_safety.pdf [hereinafter Cox Teen Online & Wireless Safety Survey]. 
 
27
 MTV—the American cable television network whose original purpose was to air music 
videos but now primarily broadcasts a variety of popular culture and reality television shows 
targeted at adolescents and young adults—has a long history of promoting social, political, 
and environmental activism in young people.  About, THINK MTV: ACTIVISM, COMMUNITY, 
POLITICS, EDUCATION, SEXUAL HEALTH, AND OTHER ISSUES, http://think.mtv.com/Info/About 
.aspx (last visited Jan. 7, 2011). 
 
28
 Associated Press is a non-profit news cooperative, owned by its American newspaper 
and broadcast members, whose mission is to deliver “unbiased news from every corner of the 
world to all media platforms and formats.”  About Us, Facts & Figures, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
http://www.ap.org/pages/about/about.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2011).  
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or videos of themselves.29  The Pew Research Center30 study, in turn, shows that only 
4% of teens ages twelve to seventeen who own cell phones reported sending a 
sexually suggestive nude or nearly-nude photo or video of themselves to someone 
else via text message, while 15% say they have received such images via text.31   
The variance in the results of these studies reveals that sexting is not as rampant 
as initially believed.  A minority of teens engage in sexting, and an even smaller 
percentage actually send photos of themselves to others.  Furthermore, in reporting 
the prevalence of sexting, studies have merely reported how many teens admit to 
having ever sent or received sexts, without inquiring into the frequency of such 
conduct.32  Even if nearly 20% of teens admit to having sent or posted a provocative 
photo of themselves, this does not mean that 20% of teens continue to engage in the 
conduct.  Rather, sending a provocative photo to a boyfriend or girlfriend may have 
been a one-time occurrence.   
The limited number of studies conducted, their varying results, and their failure 
to inquire into the frequency of teens’ sexting make it difficult to ascertain whether 
sexting is widespread enough to warrant the attention it has received.  If not, then 
enacting new legislation specifically addressing sexting would be an excessive 
reaction to this conduct.33  
B.  Two Forms: Consensual vs. Nonconsensual 
As studies demonstrate, on average, teens are two times more likely to receive 
nude or semi-nude photos through texts than actually send photos of themselves.34  
The discrepancy in the numbers indicates that there are two distinct forms of sexting: 
                                                          
 
29
 The Associated Press-MTV Poll Digital Abuse Survey, KNOWLEDGE NETWORKS (Sept. 23, 
2009), http://surveys.ap.org/data%5CKnowledgeNetworks%5CAP_Digital_Abuse_Topline_ 09 
2209.pdf [hereinafter MTV-AP Digital Abuse Survey]. 
 
30
 The Pew Research Center is “a nonpartisan ‘fact tank’ that provides information on the 
issues, attitudes and trends shaping America and the world . . . by conducting public opinion 
polling and social science research; by analyzing news coverage; and by holding forums and 
briefings.” About the Center, PEW RESEARCH CTR., http://pewresearch.org/about/ (last visited 
Jan. 7, 2011).  “It does not take positions on policy issues.”  Id. 
 
31
 Amanda Lenhart, Teens and Sexting: How and Why Minor Teens are Sending Sexually 
Suggestive Nude or Nearly Nude Images Via Text Messaging, PEW RESEARCH CTR. 4-5 (Dec. 
15, 2009), http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2009/PIP_Teens_and_Sexting. 
pdf [hereinafter Pew Teens and Sexting Survey]. 
 
32
 See Cox Teen Online & Wireless Safety Survey, supra note 26, at 34-43; MTV-AP 
Digital Abuse Survey, supra note 29, at 14-18; Pew Teens and Sexting Survey, supra note 31, 
at 4-6; Sex and Tech, supra note 19, at 11-14. 
 
33
 Clay Calvert, Sex, Cell Phones, Privacy, and the First Amendment: When Children 
Become Child Pornographers and the Lolita Effect Undermines the Law, 18 COMMLAW 
CONSPECTUS 1, 8 (2009) (stating that “[i]f sexting is rare, then its scarcity would seem to 
mitigate the need to create new laws specifically designed to handle and address” it). 
 
34
 Cox Teen Online & Wireless Safety Survey, supra note 26, at 34 (showing that the ratio 
of teens sending sexts versus receiving them is about 1 to 2); MTV-AP Digital Abuse Survey, 
supra note 29, at 14 (showing that the ratio of teens sending sexts versus receiving them is 
about 1 to 2); Pew Teens and Sexting Survey, supra note 31, at 2 (showing that the ratio of 
teens sending sexts versus receiving them is about 1 to 3); Sex and Tech, supra note 19, at 11 
(showing that the ratio of teens sending sexts versus receiving them is about 2 to 3).  
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consensual, usually occurring between two teens involved in a romantic relationship, 
and nonconsensual, when one of those teens forwards the other teen’s image to 
people without the other teen’s consent.    
1.  Consensual Sexting 
Among the top reasons reported for sexting between teens is what appears to be a 
form of high-tech flirting.  Indeed, 71% of teen girls and 67% of teen boys who have 
sent or posted sexually suggestive content say they have done so to a boyfriend or 
girlfriend;35 66% of teen girls and 60% of teen boys say they sent sexually 
suggestive content to be fun or flirtatious;36 and 52% of teen girls did so as a “sexy 
present” for their boyfriend.37  Additionally, 34% of teen girls say they did it to “feel 
sexy.”38   
As a voluntary and private exchange, sexting between two teens in and of itself 
does not harm its participants.  However, a frequent objection is that it leads teens to 
overstep sexual boundaries.39  Compared to other forms of sexual conduct in which 
teens engage, including actual sexual intercourse, sexting is much tamer.  The only 
tangible harm that comes from private, consensual sexting is the possibility of being 
convicted under child pornography laws.  The consequences of such a conviction, 
such as being labeled a sex offender, are indeed harmful to the teens involved.40 
2.  Nonconsensual Sexting 
Though one may argue that consensual sexting in and of itself is not harmful, the 
problem is that sexting easily and often morphs from the consensual to 
nonconsensual form.  Among teens, this situation often occurs after a fight or a 
break-up.41  For example, one person from a dissolved relationship forwards photos 
of his or her former love interest to other people as a form of retaliation or 
blackmail.42  Studies show that a majority of teens recognize the significant risk of 
sexting going from private flirting to mass-forwarding and humiliation.43    
Indeed, statistics show that the risk of a private image sent via cell phone or 
email going viral in the community is not only possible, but also quite likely.  Sex 
                                                          
 
35
 Sex and Tech, supra note 19, at 2. 
 
36
 Id. at 4. 
 
37
 Id. 
 
38
 Id. 
 
39
 See Help Kids Evaluate the Latest High-Tech Trends, THE PARENT-LINK (Aug. 2008), 
http://studentfire.org/online/wp-content/uploads/2008/08/parentlinkaugust2008.pdf (stating 
that sexting “has contributed to the obliteration of sexual boundaries”). 
 
40
 See supra note 6 and infra note 156. 
 
41
 Pew Teens and Sexting Survey, supra note 31, at 7. 
 
42
 Id. 
 
43
 MTV-AP Digital Abuse Survey, supra note 29, at 4 (reporting that 76% of those 
surveyed have thought about the fact that it is hard to know where pictures shared on the 
Internet or a cell phone might end up); Sex and Tech, supra note 19, at 3 (reporting that 44% 
of teens say it is common for sexually suggestive text messages to get shared with people 
other than the intended recipient).  
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2010
692 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:685 
 
and Tech reports that 40% of teens and young adults have had a sexually suggestive 
message that was meant to be private shown to them.44  The study further reports that 
25% of teen girls and 33% percent of teen boys say they have had nude or semi-nude 
images originally meant for someone else shared with them,45 while 20% of all teens 
admit to having shared such messages with someone other than the person for whom 
it was originally intended.46  The MTV-AP Digital Abuse Survey reports that 8% of 
teens and young adults said someone sent them naked pictures or videos of someone 
else via cell phone or on the Internet,47 and 11% said they have been shown naked 
pictures of someone without that person’s permission.48 
Unlike consensual sexting, forwarding nude or semi-nude images of a person 
without that person’s consent causes substantial harm.  Because of the fragile 
emotional state of some adolescents, the embarrassment and mental anguish of 
having their nude photos distributed to other people can be devastating, even deadly.  
Jessica Logan, a high school teen from Cincinnati, Ohio, took her own life after 
enduring months of harassment and taunting for sending nude photos of herself to 
her boyfriend via text message.49  After they broke up, Jessica’s boyfriend sent the 
photos to fellow high school students.50  The harassment that followed turned out to 
be too much for Jessica to handle; in July 2008, just months after the harassment 
began, she hanged herself in her bedroom.51   
The impact of nonconsensual sexting can go well beyond the emotional state of 
the victim.  Once an image is sent into the digital world, it can exist forever after 
being uploaded onto the Internet or sent through emails.  As the National Crime 
Prevention Counsel has stated, a provocative or nude photograph may be “an 
electronic fingerprint that can damage [teens’] college careers, future employment 
opportunities, and reputation with friends, family, and neighbors.”52   
Nonconsensual sexting may also be harmful to society in general.  Once an 
image of a nude teen is posted on the Internet, it is possible for sexual predators to 
obtain a copy of it and use it for their own deplorable purposes.  The risk of 
commercial exploitation of sexts is illustrated by the case in Syracuse, New York, in 
which a teenage boy collected from the Internet images of teen girls who had 
“sexted” revealing photos of themselves to their boyfriends.53  The boy was 
                                                          
 
44
 Sex and Tech, supra note 19, at 2. 
 
45
 Id. at 3. 
 
46
 Id. at 2. 
 
47
 MTV-AP Digital Abuse Survey, supra note 29, at 14. 
 
48
 Id.  
 
49
 Celizic, supra note 1. 
 
50
 Id. 
 
51
 Id. 
 
52
 Sexting: How Parents Can Keep Their Kids Safe, NAT’L CRIME PREVENTION COUNCIL, 
http://www.ncpc.org/resources/files/pdf/internet-safety/NCPC-FactSheet2.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 7, 2011). 
 
53
 Calvert, supra note 33, at 4. 
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compiling the provocative images onto a DVD that he intended to sell.54  The 
repercussions of teens’ nude photos going viral in the community or being made 
accessible to the public are no laughing matter.  
C.  It’s Criminal: A Response to Sexting 
Adolescents taking and sharing nude or semi-nude photos of themselves as a 
risqué form of flirting or a way to “feel sexy” is not a new concept.  One may argue 
that sexting today is what Polaroid cameras were in the late 1970s and ‘80s.55  The 
notable difference, however, is that the digital era has made it possible for almost 
instantaneous and widespread sharing of such images via cell phones and the 
Internet.56  It seems this difference has been the driving force behind prosecutors 
across the nation bringing charges against teens in order to chill what they believe to 
be dangerous behavior.  Yet prosecutors have been puzzled as to what laws befit the 
act of sexting.57  With no laws specifically addressing this conduct, many have 
hesitated to charge teens at all, especially because the statutes that can be read to 
apply to sexting often carry grave penalties, including a felony record, sex-registry 
requirements, and even imprisonment.58  Other prosecutors, embracing a hard-
handed approach in order to set an example and quickly chill the sexting fad, have 
chosen to charge teens that have been caught sexting under existing child 
pornography laws.59   
In Greensburg, Pennsylvania, for example, child pornography charges were 
brought against six teens after three girls sent nude photographs of themselves to 
three male classmates.60  In New Jersey, a fourteen-year-old girl was charged with 
possession and distribution of child pornography after posting naked pictures of 
                                                          
 
54
 Id. 
 
55
 Camille Webb, ‘Sexting:’ Strike a Pose. Press Send. Regret It Forever., HEALTH 
LEADER, http://www.uthealthleader.org/archive/Children_Teens/2009/sexting-0514.htm (last 
visited Jan. 7, 2011). 
 
56
 Id. 
 
57
 OHIO LEGIS. SERV. COMM’N, FISCAL NOTE & LOCAL IMPACT STATEMENT, H.B. 132, 
128th Gen. Assemb., at 3 (2009), available at http://www.lbo.state.oh.us/fiscal/fiscalnotes/128 
ga/pdfs/hb0132in.pdf.  
 
58
 For instance, under federal law a first-time offender who knowingly disseminates or 
distributes child pornography will be fined and imprisoned between five and twenty years. 18 
U.S.C.A. § 2252(b)(1) (West 2008).   
 
59
 One prosecutor in Virginia explained that even though he did not want to give offenders 
felony records, because sexting “seems to be growing in numbers and growing out of control” 
he “decided to charge someone to send a message and slow it down or stop it.”  Donna St. 
George, Sending of Explicit Photos Can Land Teens in Legal Fix, WASH. POST (May 7, 2009), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/06/AR2009050604088.html 
(quoting William F. Neely, Attorney for the Commonwealth of Va.). 
 
60
 Ed Pilkington, Sexting Craze Leads to Child Pornography Charges: Pennsylvania 
Youngsters Who Circulated Nude Pictures Becomes Latest ‘Sexters’ to Face Prosecution, 
GUARDIAN NEWS AND MEDIA (Jan. 14, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jan/14/ 
child-pornography-sexting. 
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herself on her MySpace account.61  In Ohio, felony charges were brought against a 
fifteen-year-old girl for taking nude photos of herself with her cell phone and 
sending them to some of her high school classmates.62  In Virginia, a fifteen-year-old 
and an eighteen-year-old were charged with possession of child pornography and 
electronic solicitation for having nude and semi-nude images on their cell phones.63  
And in Tunkhannock, Pennsylvania, approximately twenty teens were threatened 
with child pornography charges for having and receiving nude or semi-nude 
photographs of other teens on their cell phones.64    
Though prosecuting teens for sexting under child pornography laws is a 
nationwide occurrence, the focus of this Note is on its implications and justification 
in the state of Ohio.  With that in mind, this Note will address the prevalent criticism 
that child pornography laws are inapposite to the situation of teens sexting.  To 
illustrate this point, it is first necessary to discuss why such laws―which clearly 
place restrictions on forms of free speech―have been justified in the first place. 
III.  ABRIDGING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO PROTECT CHILDREN 
The First Amendment commands, “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech.”65  Enacting laws that criminalize protected speech is one of the 
most obvious and harshest ways that the government may violate this provision.66  It 
is well established that speech may not be prohibited merely because its content may 
be offensive to some.  Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that “the fact that 
society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it.”67  
This First Amendment protection extends not only to speech, but to expression as 
well,68 including simple, non-obscene nudity in photographs or films.69   
                                                          
 
61
 Associated Press, Girl Posts Nude Pics, Is Charged with Kid Porn: New Jersey Teen 
May Have to Register as a Sex Offender, MSNBC (March 27, 2009), http://www.msnbc.msn. 
com/id/29912729/.  
 
62
 Associated Press, Girl, 15, Faces Child Porn Charges for Nude Cell Phone Pictures of 
Herself, FOX NEWS (Oct. 9, 2008), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,434645,00.html. 
 
63
 Ellen Biltz, ‘Sexting’ Charges Faced by Two Teens, Tips for Parents: Two Spotsylvania 
Students Charged in Sexting Case, THE FREE LANCE-STAR (Mar. 11, 2009), available at 2009 
WLNR 4629127 (Westlaw). 
 
64
 Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634, 637-38 (M.D. Pa. 2009). 
 
65
 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 
66
 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 244 (2002) (“The government may violate 
this [First Amendment] mandate in many ways, but a law imposing criminal penalties on 
protected speech is a stark example of speech suppression.” (citations omitted)). 
 
67
 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978). 
 
68
 FRED H. CATE, THE INTERNET AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: SCHOOLS AND SEXUALLY 
EXPLICIT EXPRESSION 35 (1998). 
 
69
 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765 n.18 (1982); see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 
844, 874 (1997) (“In evaluating the free speech rights of adults, we have made it perfectly 
clear that ‘[s]exual expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First 
Amendment.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 
U.S. 115, 126 (1989))). 
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A.  Obscenity 
Notwithstanding the First Amendment protections, Congress may pass valid laws 
inhibiting certain forms of speech or expression for a compelling interest.70  In 
finding that the state has a compelling interest in guarding society from obscenity, 
the United States Supreme Court in Roth v. United States declared obscene material 
unprotected under the First Amendment.71  The Court, distinguishing mere sexual 
material from that which is obscene, defined obscene material as that “which deals 
with sex in a manner appealing to the prurient interest.”72  The Court went on to say 
that its definition of obscene material was no different than that in the American Law 
Institute’s Model Penal Code: material “is obscene if, considered as a whole, its 
predominant appeal is to prurient interest, i.e., a shameful or morbid interest in 
nudity, sex, or excretion, and it goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor 
in description or representation of such matters.”73  A line of cases following Roth 
led to Miller v. California, which established the current test for obscenity.74  In 
determining whether material is obscene, this test requires a court to ask: 
(a) whether “the average person, applying contemporary community 
standards” would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the 
prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently 
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state 
law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, 
artistic, political, or scientific value.75 
Although the Miller test requires that a statute delineate which specific sexual 
activities constitute obscenity, it leaves the issue of whether depictions of those 
activities go beyond community standards to be determined on a case-by-case 
basis.76  
B.  Child Pornography 
The United States Supreme Court further restricted of freedom of expression in 
New York v. Ferber by holding that pornography involving minors can be proscribed 
whether or not the images are obscene under the definition set forth in Miller v. 
California.77  The Court’s distinction between child pornography and other sexually 
explicit speech was justified by its finding of a compelling interest in “‘safeguarding 
the physical and psychological well-being of . . . minor[s]’”78 by protecting them 
                                                          
 
70
 See 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 514 (2010).   
 
71
 KEVIN W. SAUNDERS, SAVING OUR CHILDREN FROM THE FIRST AMENDMENT 124-25 
(2003) (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)). 
 
72
 Id. at 125. 
 
73
 Id.  
 
74
 Id. 
 
75
 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (citations omitted).  
 
76
 SAUNDERS, supra note 71, at 125. 
 
77
 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
 
78
 Id. at 756-57 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982)). 
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from being exploited and abused by “perverts” and “pedophiles” in the production 
process and use of child pornography.79   
In Osborne v. Ohio, the Court went a step further, holding that private possession 
of child pornography in the home should be criminalized even though precedent 
defended the private possession of obscene material.80  Again, the Court’s 
justification for its decision was “to protect ‘the victims of child pornography’ and to 
destroy ‘a market for the exploitative use of children.’”81  This decision solidified the 
compelling governmental interest in protecting children from abuse and exploitation 
inherent in the production and use of child pornography.  
C.  Variable Obscenity and Sexual Conduct of Minors 
Though children “‘are entitled to a significant measure of First Amendment 
protection,’”82 in many instances they “have more limited First Amendment rights 
than do adults.”83  Consequently, when it comes to sexually explicit expression, 
courts have permitted greater regulation and even prohibition when the audience or 
participants include minors.84  As discussed above, states may prohibit the depiction 
of minors in sexually explicit photographs and films, as well as the distribution and 
mere possession of such material, “in an effort to eliminate the market for child 
pornography.”85  In addition, the United States Supreme Court has upheld laws that 
restrict minors’ access to sexually explicit material even when such material is not 
obscene by adult standards.86  
In Ginsburg v. New York, a storeowner was convicted for selling an adult 
magazine that contained female nudity to a sixteen-year-old boy.87  The United 
States Supreme Court upheld the conviction under a New York statute that made it a 
crime to “knowingly . . . sell . . . to a minor . . . any picture . . . which depicts nudity, 
sexual conduct or sadomasochistic abuse and which is harmful to minors.”88  In 
                                                          
 
79
 Id. at 758; see also Stopping Child Pornography: Protecting our Children and the 
Constitution: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 5 (2002) (statement 
of Rep. Earl Pomeroy, N.D.) (stating that child pornography is damaging because “[p]erverts 
and pedophiles not only use this smut to whet their sick desires, but also to lure defenseless 
children into unspeakable acts of sexual exploitation”). 
 
80
 PHILIP JENKINS, BEYOND TOLERANCE: CHILD PORNOGRAPHY ON THE INTERNET 37-38 
(2001) (citing Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990)). 
 
81
 Id. at 38. 
 
82
 Video Software Dealers Assoc. v. Schwarzenegger, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1044 (N.D. 
Cal. 2007) (quoting Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212 (1975)); see also 
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (stating that students 
do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse 
gate”). 
 
83
 Russo v. Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 469 F.2d 623, 631 (2d Cir. 1972). 
 
84
 CATE, supra note 68, at 46. 
 
85
 Id. 
 
86
 See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968). 
 
87
 Id. at 631. 
 
88
 See id. at 647, app. A (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 484-h(2)).  
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arriving at its decision, the Court recognized that the “potential harm to children’s 
ethical and psychological development” that may be caused by exposure to sexually 
explicit material is a legitimate reason for “trying to shield them from forms of 
sexual expression that fall short of obscenity.”89  Thus, the Court upheld the doctrine 
of “variable obscenity,”90 the idea that material that is not obscene when distributed 
to adults may nevertheless be harmful and obscene when provided to minors.91   
Courts have not sought to identify the specific harms that sexually explicit 
material pose to minors, and instead “simply have deferred to legislative 
determinations that accessing sexually explicit material does in fact harm children.”92  
Nonetheless, research reveals that pornography indeed has many negative effects on 
children and adolescents who are directly exposed to it.93   
D.  Current Laws Reflecting the Compelling Governmental Interests 
Based on the aforementioned policy considerations, Congress has enacted a 
handful of laws specifically aimed at eradicating the production and use of child 
pornography and at preventing minors’ exposure to obscene materials and adult 
pornography.  Section 2252A of Title 18 of the United States Code explicitly 
prohibits certain activities relating to material constituting or containing child 
pornography.  “Child pornography” is defined as any visual depiction of sexually 
explicit conduct involving a minor,94 while “sexually explicit conduct” is defined as 
actual or simulated sexual intercourse, bestiality, masturbation, or the lascivious 
exhibition of genitals or pubic area.95  Other related federal prohibitions include 
                                                          
 
89
 Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 576 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing 
Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639-43).  
 
90
 CATE, supra note 68, at 46.  
 
91
 SAUNDERS, supra note 71, at 133; see also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-
50 (1978) (finding that even though regulations on radio broadcasts of adult material―in this 
case, comedian George Carlin’s monologue about the “seven dirty words”―place a restriction 
on adults’ access to sexually explicit expression, such regulations are constitutional when 
necessary to protect children); Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 
1043, 1053 n.18 (2d Cir. 1979) (“[S]tate[s] can appropriately legislate a state-wide ‘variable’ 
standard of obscenity with respect to children, [and], in some circumstances, expression that is 
suitable for adults can be suppressed because of its potential effect on children.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 
92
 CATE, supra note 68, at 47.   
 
93
 Jill Manning, a practicing marriage and family therapist, explains that the negative 
effects of pornography on children include: traumatic emotional responses, earlier onset of 
first sexual intercourse, reinforcement of the commoditization of sex and the objectification of 
humans, the belief that being married or having a family are unattractive prospects, increased 
risk of developing sexual compulsions and addictive behavior, increased risk of exposure to 
incorrect information about human sexuality, and overestimating the prevalence of less 
common practices like group sex, bestiality, and sadomasochistic activity. Why the 
Government Should Care About Pornography: The State Interest in Protecting Children and 
Families: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Property Rights 
of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 12-13 (2005) (statement of Jill Manning).  
 
94
 18 U.S.C.A. § 2256(8). 
 
95
 Id. § 2256(2)(A).   
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obscene visual representations of the sexual abuse of children,96 the transfer of 
obscene material to minors,97 sexual exploitation of children,98 and certain activities 
relating to material involving the sexual exploitation of minors.99   
Under current Ohio law, which makes no distinction as to the age of the 
perpetrator, sending or creating erotic photos of a minor may be a felony.100  The 
prohibitions include disseminating obscene material that is harmful to juveniles,101 
pandering obscenity involving a minor,102 and pandering sexually oriented matter 
involving a minor.103  The illegal use of a minor in nudity-oriented material or 
performance is also a felony,104 as is endangering children by making them 
participate in, or be photographed for material or performance that is obscene, 
sexually oriented, or nudity-oriented.105   
Material is considered “obscene” under Ohio law if “[i]ts dominant appeal is to 
prurient interest” or if “[i]ts dominant tendency is to arouse lust by displaying or 
depicting sexual activity, masturbation, sexual excitement, or nudity in a way that 
                                                          
 
96
 Id. § 1466A (prohibiting representations depicting a minor engaging in sexually explicit 
conduct, or that which is obscene). 
 
97
 Id. § 1470. 
 
98
 Id. § 2251. 
 
 
99
 Id. § 2252. 
 
100
 Press Release, Montgomery Cnty. Prosecutor’s Office, Prosecutor’s Juvenile Diversion 
Program Announced: “Sexting” Will Be Targeted (Mar. 4, 2009), http://www.mcohio.org/ 
Prosecutor/docs/03042009_Juvenile_Diversion_Program.pdf. 
 
101
 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.31 (West 2010) (stating that no person shall “[d]irectly 
sell, deliver, furnish, disseminate, provide, exhibit, rent, or present to a juvenile [or] group of 
juveniles . . . any material or performance that is obscene or harmful to juveniles”).  A 
violation of this statute is a misdemeanor of the first degree if the material involved is harmful 
to juveniles and a felony if the material involved is obscene.  Id.  
 
102
 Id. § 2907.321 (stating that no person shall “[c]reate, reproduce, or publish any obscene 
material that has a minor as one of its participants or portrayed observers” or “[b]uy, procure, 
possess, or control any obscene material, that has a minor as one of its participants”). 
 
103
 Id. § 2907.322 (stating that no person shall “[c]reate, record, photograph, film, develop, 
reproduce, or publish any material that shows a minor participating or engaging in sexual 
activity, masturbation, or bestiality” or “[k]nowingly solicit, receive, purchase, exchange, 
possess, or control” such material). 
 
104
 Id. § 2907.323 (stating that no person shall “[p]hotograph any minor who is not the 
person’s child or ward in a state of nudity, or create, direct, produce, . . . transfer” or 
“[p]ossess or view any material or performance that shows a minor who is not the person’s 
child or ward in a state of nudity,” unless the minor’s parents, guardians, or custodians 
consent in writing and the material is to be used for a “bona fide artistic, medical, scientific, 
educational, religious, governmental, judicial, or other proper purpose”).  
 
105
 Id. § 2919.22(B) (5) (stating that no person shall “[e]ntice, coerce, permit, encourage, 
compel, hire, employ, use, or allow [a] child to act, model, or in any other way participate in, 
or be photographed for, the production, presentation, dissemination, or advertisement of any 
material or performance that the offender knows or reasonably should know is obscene, is 
sexually oriented matter, or is nudity-oriented matter”). 
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tends to represent human beings as mere objects of sexual appetite.”106  In 
determining whether it is obscene, material is “judged with reference to ordinary 
adults or, if it is designed for sexual deviates or other specially susceptible group, 
judged with reference to that group.”107  Thus, in the context of sexting between 
teens, whether images are obscene ought to be judged with reference to the minors 
involved.   
Notably, mere depictions of nude minors are not illegal under Ohio law.  First, 
the “nudity-oriented material” included under the endangering children statute 
(O.R.C. § 2919.22) is defined as material or performance showing a minor in a state 
of nudity that, “taken as a whole by the average person applying contemporary 
community standards, appeals to prurient interest.”108  Second, under the Ohio 
Supreme Court’s holding in State v. Young, the prohibition on the illegal use of a 
minor in nudity-oriented material (O.R.C. § 2907.323) only applies to depictions of 
nudity involving “a lewd exhibition or . . . a graphic focus on the [minor’s] 
genitals.”109  The Young court reached its conclusion because “[t]he clear purpose of 
these exceptions [relating to material that is to be used for a bona fide artistic, 
medical, scientific, educational, religious, governmental, judicial, or other proper 
purpose] is to sanction the possession or viewing of material depicting nude minors 
where that conduct is morally innocent.”110  Thus, according to the court, only 
conduct that is not morally innocent—the possession or viewing of the material for 
prurient purposes—is prohibited by the statute. 111  
                                                          
 
106
 Id. § 2907.01(F).  Though not pertinent to our discussion, the statute also deems 
material obscene if:  
(3) Its dominant tendency is to arouse lust by displaying or depicting bestiality or 
extreme or bizarre violence, cruelty, or brutality; 
(4) Its dominant tendency is to appeal to scatological interest by displaying or 
depicting human bodily functions of elimination in a way that inspires disgust or 
revulsion in persons with ordinary sensibilities, without serving any genuine scientific, 
educational, sociological, moral, or artistic purpose; 
(5) It contains a series of displays or descriptions of sexual activity, masturbation, 
sexual excitement, nudity, bestiality, extreme or bizarre violence, cruelty, or brutality, 
or human bodily functions of elimination, the cumulative effect of which is a 
dominant tendency to appeal to prurient or scatological interest, when the appeal to 
such an interest is primarily for its own sake or for commercial exploitation, rather 
than primarily for a genuine scientific, educational, sociological, moral, or artistic 
purpose. 
Id. 
 
107
 Id.  
 
108
 Id. § 2919.22(D)(4)(b) (emphasis added). 
 
109
 State v. Young, 525 N.E.2d 1363, 1368 (Ohio 1988).  “Lewd” is defined as “[o]bscene 
or indecent; tending to moral impurity or wantonness.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 
2004). 
 
110
 Young, 525 N.E.2d at 1367. 
 
111
 Id. at 1367-68 (emphasis in original).  This aspect of the Young decision was affirmed 
by the United States Supreme Court in Osborne v. Ohio.  See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 
(1990).  Osborne reversed Young on other grounds that are not relevant for purposes of this 
note.  Id. at 122-26. 
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IV.  SEXTING AND CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LAWS:  FITTING A SQUARE PEG IN A ROUND 
HOLE112 
A.  Sexting That Falls Outside the Statutory Language of Child Pornography 
Not all sexting fits the plain language of current child pornography laws.  As 
outlined above, in order to fall under federal child pornography laws, sexting must 
be obscene, a lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a minor, a 
depiction of sexually explicit conduct involving a minor, or constitute child 
exploitation or abuse.113  A teen voluntarily taking and sending to someone else a 
photo of himself or herself is not a victim of abuse or exploitation.  Arguably, if the 
photo becomes public it may reach the hands of sexual predators and pedophiles who 
may then use it as a tool for child abuse or exploitation.  However, this situation is 
contingent on the images being sent to third parties in the form of nonconsensual 
sexting, which is distinct from the consensual, private form.   
Sexting also often fails to fit under child pornography laws that proscribe 
obscene materials.  As stated above, determining whether material is obscene is a 
fact-specific analysis made in light of contemporary community standards.114  If the 
contemporary community standard applied is today’s overly sexualized society, it is 
unlikely that sexting would pass the obscenity threshold.  Moreover, images of 
minors from the waist up, as is common among teen girls who sext, do not satisfy 
the definition of child pornography under federal law as these neither depict sexual 
conduct nor the genitals or pubic area of a minor.115 
 Turning to Ohio’s child pornography laws, a teen who sexts may be charged 
with a felony if the images of a minor are obscene, depict a minor engaging in sexual 
conduct, or depict nudity of a minor that appeals to a prurient interest.116  The 
touchstone of Ohio’s statutes relating to obscene and nudity-oriented material 
involving a minor is that the material in question is “obscene” because both the 
obscenity and nudity-oriented statutes include this language.117  Material, in turn, is 
considered “obscene” under Ohio law if “[i]ts dominant appeal is to prurient 
interest.”118  Black’s Law Dictionary defines prurient interest as one “[c]haracterized 
by or arousing inordinate or unusual sexual desire.”119   
                                                          
 
112
 Don Corbett, Let’s Talk About Sext: The Challenge of Finding the Right Legal Response 
to the Teenage Practice of “Sexting,” 13-6 J. INTERNET L. 3, 6 (2009) (“Sexting cases 
represent a microcosm of the larger complication of fitting the proverbial square peg of 
technology into the round hole of existing laws, most of which were drafted long before 
today’s scientific feats were even conceivable.”). 
 
113
 See supra Part III.D. 
 
114
 See supra Part III.A. 
 
115
 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2256(2)(A), (8) (West 2010). 
 
116
 See supra Part III.D. 
 
117
 See supra notes 101, 102 & 105 and accompanying text.   
 
118
 See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 
119
 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added).  
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Whether material exchanged via sexting appeals to a prurient interest should be 
judged with reference to the participants, i.e., teenagers.120  With this in mind, an 
argument may be made that there is nothing inordinate or unusual about teens’ 
sexual interest in their peers.121  Indeed, Ohio’s laws permit sexual conduct between 
teens who are between thirteen and seventeen years old.122  Thus, Ohio law implies 
that it is not immoral or unusual for such minors to engage in sexual conduct.  It 
would be illogical to hold that while teens engaging in sexual conduct with each 
other is lawful, teens creating and viewing photos depicting teen nudity―not even 
sexual conduct―is not.  Yet, this is exactly what prosecuting sexting teens under 
Ohio’s child pornography laws asserts.  
B.  Sexting Falls Outside the Scope of Child Pornography Laws for Policy Reasons 
Though many instances of sexting do not fit under the statutory language of child 
pornography and related statutes,123 there are cases where it undoubtedly does.  For 
example, in Florida two teens took and exchanged with each other photos of 
themselves engaging in unspecified sexual behavior.124  The fact that the images 
depicted the minors engaging in sexual activity, and not mere nudity, placed the 
conduct under the federal definition of child pornography, which includes any visual 
depiction of minors engaging in actual or simulated sexual intercourse.125  Such 
images also fall under the ambit of Ohio’s laws, which prohibit any person from 
creating material that shows a minor participating or engaging in sexual activity.126   
Even when sexting falls under the black-letter-law of child pornography, 
however, it should not be prosecuted as such for policy reasons.  Two recent cases 
emphasize that the purpose of child pornography laws is to protect children from 
child abuse and exploitation.  Because sextingat least in its consensual 
formconstitutes neither child abuse nor child exploitation and prosecuting teens 
under child pornography laws is more harmful to teens than the underlying conduct, 
child pornography laws should not be used to prosecute teen sexting.  
                                                          
 
120
 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.  
 
121
 The proximity in age is important to this argument.  The status of being a minor does 
not automatically immunize a person from child pornography charges.  For example, judging 
from community standards, a seventeen-year-old’s sexual interest in a twelve-year-old is 
likely to be found inordinate.  Thus, nude photos of the twelve year old would appeal to a 
“prurient” (inordinate and unusual) interest of the seventeen-year-old, thereby falling under 
Ohio’s child pornography laws.  
 
122
 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.04 (West 2010). 
 
123
  In this Author’s opinion, most instances of sexting do not fit under child pornography 
statutes.  The fact that teens have been charged under child pornography laws indicates that 
the statutory interpretation proposed here has not always been applied. 
 
124
 A.H. v. Florida, 949 So. 2d 234, 235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (allowing the 
government to go forward with the prosecution of a sixteen-year-old girl under a child 
pornography statute based on photos that she and her seventeen-year-old boyfriend took 
which depicted them naked and engaged in sexual behavior).  
 
125
 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2256(8) (West 2010). 
 
126
 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.322. 
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1.  Miller v. Skumanick and Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition 
The argument that child pornography laws are inapposite to sexting was recently 
argued before a federal court of appeals for the first time.  On January 19, 2010, a 
case involving criminal prosecutions of teenagers for sexting made its way to the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals.127  The case stemmed from three teenage girls and 
their parents bringing suit in Pennsylvania under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against former 
Wyoming County District Attorney George Skumanick Jr., claiming that his threats 
to prosecute the girls under child pornography laws if they refused to participate in a 
program he designed to educate teens about the dangers of sexting violated their 
First Amendment rights.128  They also moved for a temporary restraining order 
(TRO) to enjoin Skumanick from initiating criminal charges against the girls.129  
Because plaintiffs made a reasonable argument that the images of the girls did 
not qualify as the type of images prohibited under Pennsylvania’s child pornography 
statute, the District Court granted the TRO and stated that there was “a reasonable 
likelihood that the plaintiffs could prevail” on their claim that a protected 
activity―freedom of expression―caused the retaliation.130  Thus, the court implied 
that if a minor takes nude or semi-nude photos of himself or herself and the image 
falls outside the scope of child pornography laws, then the minor is exercising his or 
her right of freedom of expression protected under the First Amendment.131   
On appeal, Skumanick’s attorney insisted that the re-education program was an 
appropriate response to “girls . . . transmit[ing] nude photos of themselves for no 
other purpose than sexual gratification”132 because children are immature and 
vulnerable and the juvenile criminal system is designed “to protect children from 
themselves.”133  Notably, Judge Ambro, one of the presiding appellate judges, 
responded: “If that’s your goal―to protect them―then why threaten, by prosecuting 
them, putting a permanent blot on their escutcheon, for life?”134  Judge Ambro’s 
                                                          
 
127
 Shannon P. Duffy, 3rd Circuit Panel Mulls if Teen ‘Sexting’ Is Child Pornography, THE 
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Jan. 19, 2010), available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1 
202439023330. 
 
128
 Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634, 640 (M.D. Pa. 2009). 
 
129
 Id.    
 
130
 Id. at 645-46.  Skumanick threatened to prosecute the girls under 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 
6312, which prohibits the distribution of images depicting a prohibited sexual act, and defines 
“prohibited sexual act” to mean “[s]exual intercourse, . . . masturbation, sadism, masochism, 
bestiality, fellatio, cunnilingus, lewd exhibition of the genitals or nudity if such nudity is 
depicted for the purpose of sexual stimulation or gratification of any person who might view 
such depiction.”  18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6312(g) (2009).  The photographs at issue depicted 
two of the girls from the waist up wearing opaque bras.  The photo of the third girl showed her 
topless with a towel around her waist.  None of the photos depicted sexual acts or an 
exhibition of the genitals.    
 
131
 Additionally, the court held that threatening to prosecute the girls was “an attempt to 
compel [the parents] to abandon their Fourteenth Amendment right to control their child’s 
upbringing.”  Miller, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 645. 
 
132
 Duffy, supra note 127. 
 
133
 Id. 
 
134
 Id. 
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remark pinpoints the principal criticism against prosecuting teens who are caught 
sexting under child pornography laws: it is simply unreasonable to punish minors 
under laws intended to protect them, especially because the conduct for which they 
are being punished does not constitute sexual abuse or exploitation of children, 
which the laws in question are meant to address.   
A recent United States Supreme Court decision supports this criticism.  In 
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the Court held that a federal law banning 
“virtual” child pornography was unconstitutional because the speech being regulated 
did not involve the use of real children and was not otherwise obscene.135  In arriving 
at its decision, the Court noted that “Ferber’s judgment about child pornography was 
based upon how it was made, not on what it communicated . . . [and] reaffirmed that 
where the speech is neither obscene nor the product of sexual abuse, it does not fall 
outside the protection of the First Amendment.”136  Thus, the Ashcroft decision 
suggests that the scope of the child pornography exception to First Amendment 
protection should be limited to the governmental objectives outlined in Ferber and 
Osborne.137  In other words, its scope “should be limited to materials that are 
produced by means of criminal child abuse and exploitation.”138 
2.  Consensual Sexting Does Not Constitute Child Abuse or Exploitation  
A widely accepted definition of “child sexual abuse” is the “involvement of 
dependent, developmentally immature children and adolescents in sexual activities 
they do not fully comprehend, to which they are unable to give informed consent, or 
that violate the social taboos of family roles.”139  Although there are variations of this 
definition, they all encompass at least two factors: (1) sexual activities involving 
minors, and (2) “an abusive condition, such as coercion or lack of consent.”140   
Sexual abuse and exploitation of children are inextricably connected.  The 
National Coalition to Prevent Child Sexual Exploitation defines child exploitation as 
“[p]ractices by which a person, usually an adult, achieves sexual gratification, 
financial gain, or advancement through the sexual abuse or sexual exploitation of a 
child.”141  Indeed, sexual exploitation has been defined as a form of child 
                                                          
 
135
 United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 289 (2008) (citing Ashcroft v. Free Speech 
Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 249-51 (2002)) (“[T]he child-protection rationale for speech restriction 
does not apply to materials produced without children.”). 
 
136
 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 250-51 (emphasis added). 
 
137
 John A. Humbach, ‘Sexting’ and the First Amendment, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 433, 
484 (2010).    
 
138
 Id. 
 
139
 C. Henry Kempe, Incest and Other Forms of Sexual Abuse, in THE BATTERED CHILD 
198 (C. Henry Kempe & Ray E. Helfer eds., 3d ed. 1980). 
 
140
 See ROGER J.R. LEVESQUE, SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN: A HUMAN RIGHTS 
PERSPECTIVE 151-52 (1999).   
 
141
 THE NAT’L COAL. TO PREVENT CHILD SEXUAL EXPLOITATION, THE NATIONAL PLAN TO 
PREVENT THE SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN 17 (2008), http://www.missingkids.com/ 
en_US/documents/NCPCSE_NationalPlan.pdf (emphasis added). 
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maltreatment.142  What distinguishes sexual exploitation from other forms of child 
abuse is that it constitutes conduct in which children are “exploited as exchangeable 
commodities” usually through “child pornography, child prostitution, and child sex-
trafficking.”143   
Traditional child pornography is created when an adult manipulates a minor to 
pose nude or semi-nude for photographs and/or engage in unlawful sexual 
conduct.144  Thus, it is a form of child abuse because there is a lack of consent on the 
part of the child.  Furthermore, the commercialization of traditional child 
pornography and the purposes that it serves makes it inherently exploitative.145   
Not all child abuse requires that the perpetrator be an adult.  Minors can commit 
sexually abusive acts similar to those perpetrated by adults against children.146  
Juveniles constitute more than one in four sex offenders and perpetrate more than 
one in three sex offenses against other youths.147  The United States Department of 
Justice classifies sex offenses committed by juveniles as either forcible (rape, 
sodomy, fondling, etc.) or nonforcible (incest, statutory rape).148  It defines a forcible 
sex offense as “any sexual act directed against another person, forcibly and/or 
against that person’s will,” and a nonforcible sex offense as one “against the 
person’s will where the victim is incapable of giving consent.”149  Therefore, sexual 
abuse between two adolescents requires that there be coercion and/or actual lack of 
consent, or a statutory presumption of lack of consent. 
There is no child sexual abuse or exploitation when it comes to consensual 
sexting between teens.  First, the unequal power dynamic inherent in the creation of 
traditional child-pornography, in which adults “lure children into pornographic 
settings for the purpose of exploiting them,” is nonexistent in consensual sexting.150  
                                                          
 
142
 LEVESQUE, supra note 140, at 60 (discussing how child pornography, which is 
exploitative in nature, is a form of child maltreatment). 
 
143
 Id.; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004), (defining “sexual exploitation” 
as “[t]he use of a person, esp[ecially] a child, in prostitution, pornography, or other sexually 
manipulative activity that has caused or could cause serious emotional injury”). 
 
144
 LEVESQUE, supra note 140, at 63. 
 
145
 Id. at 63-64 (“The sexual abuse of children during pornographic production is only part 
of the exploitation.  Much of child pornography’s utility derives from its use to lower 
children’s inhibitions and encourage children to engage in activities similar to those depicted 
in pictures and magazines.”). 
 
146
 Id. at 193.  There are generally three types of sexually abusive offenses committed by 
minors: (1) passive or noncontact offenses (e.g., voyeurism, exhibitionism, obscene phone 
calls), (2) contact offenses involving some degree of force, aggression, or coercion (e.g., rape, 
fondling), and (3) pedophiliac offenses which involve sexual acts perpetrated against younger 
victims.  Id. 
 
147
 David Finkelhor, Richard Ormrod & Mark Chaffin, Juveniles Who Commit Sex 
Offenses Against Minors, JUV. JUST. BULL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 1 (Dec. 2009), http://www. 
ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/227763.pdf. 
 
148
 Id. at 4. 
 
149
 Id. 
 
150
 Corbett, supra note 112, at 6.  
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The balanced power dynamic between teens makes it possible for non-coerced 
consent to be present.   
Second, unlike traditional child pornography, images of teenagers engaging in 
mutual and consensual sexual conduct do not depict unlawful conduct, at least in 
jurisdictions like Ohio where mutual teen sex is lawful.151  The reasoning behind 
statutory rape laws is that minors are deemed incapable of giving consent until they 
reach a certain age.152  In Ohio, where thirteen is the age of consent,153 the issue of 
statutorily-constructed lack of consent does not exist when both individuals engaged 
the sexual relationship are teens.   
Because sexual abuse requires coercion or lack of consent, voluntary sexual 
conduct and sexting between two teens does not constitute child abuse in Ohio.  
Furthermore, so long as the images remain private between the original participants, 
consensual sexting does not constitute sexual exploitation as the teens involved are 
not “exploited as exchangeable commodities,”154 but rather are engaged in a private 
exchange.  Child pornography statutes were enacted to eradicate the underlying child 
abuse and exploitation that occurs in its creation.  It is inappropriate to apply these 
statutes to consensual sexting between teens, which lacks these two elements.  
3.  Prosecuting Under Child Pornography Laws Harms Teens 
Aside from the fact that sexting does not constitute child abuse or exploitation, 
prosecuting teens for sexting under child pornography laws fails to protect children 
because the punishment under these laws is much more harmful than the underlying 
conduct.  For example, a conviction under a child pornography statute may require a 
teen to register as a sex offender.155  The stigma that this punishment carries will 
follow the teen throughout much, if not all, of his or her life.  While a provocative 
photo of a teen may have negative effects on his or her future, for example if a 
college admissions staff discovers it on the Internet, being registered as a sex 
offender undoubtedly will negatively effect the teen’s future.156   
                                                          
 
151
 While some states set forth that minors do not have any right to engage in consensual 
sexual intercourse, other states, including Ohio, have established ages at which minors are 
deemed capable to consent to sexual intercourse.  Donald T. Kramer, Adolescent Rights, in 1 
LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN § 14:12, at 1041 (Donald T. Kramer ed., rev. 2d ed. 2005).  
Though the age of consent varies from state to state and ranges from nine to seventeen years 
old, the most common age of consent is thirteen and fourteen years old.  Id. (Supp. 2009).  
Under Ohio law, a thirteen-year-old may legally consent to having sex with someone under 
the age of eighteen.  See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02 (West 2010) (“No person shall 
engage in sexual conduct with another . . . when . . . [t]he other person is less than thirteen 
years of age.”); id. § 2907.04 (“No person who is eighteen years of age or older shall engage 
in sexual conduct with another, who is not the spouse of the offender, when the offender 
knows the other person is thirteen years of age or older but less than sixteen years of age.”).   
 
152
 65 AM. JUR. 2D Rape § 11 (2010).  
 
153
 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02 (West 2010). 
 
154
 LEVESQUE, supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
 
155
 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.04, .041. 
 
156
 The case of Phillip Alpert illustrates the severe repercussions that come with being 
labeled a sex offender for sexting.  After impulsively emailing nude photos of his sixteen-
year-old girlfriend to some seventy individuals as revenge for a fight he was having with her, 
Phillip was convicted of transmitting child pornography and is now required to register as a 
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Prosecuting minors for sexting under child pornography laws is also harmful to 
teens because all parties involved are penalized.  A child in a traditional adult-child 
pornography situation would not be prosecuted for “creating child pornography” 
when coerced into doing so by an adult.  This is because the child in such a situation 
is a victim of child abuse and sexual exploitation.  Conversely, in the majority of 
sexting cases, both sides of the exchange are prosecuted, including the teens who are 
victimized by nonconsensual sexting.  Through a cold application of the law, 
prosecutors may charge the teens who distribute the images without consent with 
mere possession of child pornography, while the victimized teens may be charged 
with a more severe criminal violation of the production of child pornography.   
Certainly, some forms of sexting may fit the black-letter-law of some child 
pornography statutes.  But when the underlying purpose of these laws is considered, 
using them to prosecute teens for sexting is absurd.  Even Maureen Kanka, the 
mother of the New Jersey girl whose rape and murder inspired Megan's Law,157 has 
criticized prosecutors for charging teenagers who sext under child pornography 
statutes.158   Kanka observes, “the prosecutors are harming the children more than 
helping them.”159  An alternative to using child pornography laws against sexting 
would be enacting more appropriate laws that specifically address this conduct.  
Cynthia Logan, mother of Jessica Logan, the teenager who committed suicide after 
falling victim to nonconsensual sexting, supports Ohio’s efforts in addressing 
sexting with new legislation.160   
V.  OHIO’S PROPOSED SOLUTION: H.B. 132 
A.  A Move Toward Sexting Legislation 
The unsuitability of child pornography laws in the context of sexting has led to 
states considering alternate approaches in addressing this “problem.”  Among these 
are diversion programs,161 school education programs,162 and legislation aimed 
                                                          
sex offender until the age of forty-three.  Richards & Calvert, supra note 15, at 8-9, 21.  
Because he was labeled as a sex offender, Phillip was forced out of the college he attended, is 
unable to live with his father as his father’s home is too close to a high school, and has found 
it impossible to find employment.  Id. at 9, 21-22. 
 
157
 See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 9791-9799.99 (2010) (requiring that sex offenders who 
reside, work, or attend school in Pennsylvania register on public registries maintained by the 
State Police and that certain information of these sex offenders be available to the public 
through an Internet website).  
 
158
 Jennifer Millman, Megan’s Law Mom OK with Nude MySpace Teen, NBC N.Y. (Mar. 
27, 2009), http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local-beat/Girl-Charged-With-Child-Porn-for-
Posting-Nude-Pics-of-Self.html.   
 
159
 Id.  A related criticism is that making teen sexters register as sex offenders dilutes the 
entire purpose of sex offender registries, making it difficult to decipher who on the registry 
poses a serious risk to children.  Richards & Calvert, supra note 15, at 23. 
 
160
 Justin McClelland, ‘Sexting’ Legislation Proposed to Protect Teens, THE WESTERN 
STAR (Apr. 14, 2009), http://www.western-star.com/news/lebanon-oh-news/sexting-
legislation-proposed-to-protect-teens-76510.html?imw=Y. 
 
161
 For example, recognizing sexting as a “widespread problem” but unwilling to charge 
teens caught doing it with a felony, the Prosecuting Attorney’s Juvenile Division in 
Montgomery County, Ohio introduced a diversion program for teens accused of sexting.  
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specifically at sexting.  Whether because of a genuine belief that it is the right means 
by which sexting is to be eliminated or because the “[m]edia hysteria about [sexting] 
. . . fan[ned] the flames of legislation,”163 this last approach has gained great 
momentum with new “sexting laws” being introduced in at least eleven states.164  Six 
states enacted such laws in 2009.165  The general goals of sexting legislation are to 
deter teens from sexting, to apply appropriate penalties to teens who engage in 
sexting, or to eliminate loopholes in existing criminal laws so that sexual predators 
are prohibited from contacting children via text messages. 166  
In Ohio, State Representative Ron Maag and State Senator Bob Schuler 
introduced House Bill 132.167  The Bill proposes to enact section 2907.324 of the 
Ohio Revised Code to “prohibit a minor, by use of a telecommunications device, 
from recklessly creating, receiving exchanging, sending, or possessing a photograph 
or other material showing a minor in a state of nudity.”168  The Bill provides that “[i]t 
is no defense . . . that the minor creates, receives, exchanges, sends, or possesses”169 
the prohibited material.  A violator of the statute would be guilty of a 
misdemeanor.170   
The scope of the Bill is broader than child pornography statutes in that it 
criminalizes photos depicting nudity of minors without requiring that such photos be 
obscene or that they appeal to a prurient interest.  Rather, H.B. 132 proposes to 
criminalize the mere depiction of a minor in a “state of nudity,” with “nudity” 
defined as: 
                                                          
Press Release, Montgomery Cnty. Prosecutor’s Office, supra note 100.  Montgomery County 
Prosecuting Attorney Mathias Heck, Jr. stated:  
Certainly, we all want to keep our teens safe from sexual predators . . . [h]owever, in 
some cases, charging a juvenile with a felony and labeling [him or her] a sexual 
offender when [his or her] actions were clearly a result of poor judgment and 
ignorance of the law seems harsh for first time offenders.   
Id.  
 
162
 School Takes Aim at ‘Sexting:’ IPS Considers District-Wide Ban, 
THEINDYCHANNEL.COM (Aug. 19, 2009), http://www.theindychannel.com/education/2046895 
3/detail.html. 
 
163
 Calvert, supra note 33, at 22. 
 
164
 2009 “Sexting” Legislation, supra note 7 (listing Colo. H.B. 1132; Ind. S.R. 90; Neb. 
L.B. 97; N.J. A.B. 3754, A.B. 4068, A.B. 4069 & A.B. 4070; N.Y. A.B. 8622; N.D. H.B. 
1186; Ohio H.B. 132/S.B. 103; Or. H.B. 2641; Pa. S.B. 1121; Utah H.B. 14; and Vt. S.B. 
125). 
 
165
 Id. 
 
166
 Id. 
 
167
 McClelland, supra note 160. 
 
168
 H.B. 132, 128th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2009-10), available at 
http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/bills.cfm?ID=128_HB_132. 
 
169
 Id. 
 
170
 Id. 
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[T]he showing, representation, or depiction of human male or female 
genitals, pubic area, or buttocks with less than a full, opaque covering, or 
of a female breast with less than a full, opaque covering of any portion 
thereof below the top of the nipple, or of covered male genitals in a 
discernibly turgid state.171   
Categorically speaking, even though this prohibition encompasses photographs or 
images that could fall under the scope of child pornography (i.e., images of an 
exhibition of genitalia or focus on pubic area), it also extends to ones that do not 
(i.e., images of nude buttocks).172   
Furthermore, photographs of nude teens that are created and viewed by teens fall 
short of obscenity when teenagers are considered as the reference point.  Rather, 
such images constitute reverse “variable obscenity”: while the images are not 
obscene when the audience is minors, they are obscene when the audience is adults 
because their sexual interest in a minor is deemed inordinate under contemporary 
community standards. 
As the court in Miller v. Skumanick implied, photos that are neither obscene nor 
child pornography are a protected form of expression under the First Amendment.173  
The question remains whether legislators may enact laws restricting this non-
obscene, constitutionally protected freedom of expression of minors and, if so, under 
what circumstances. 
B.  Parens Patriae: Protecting Teens from Themselves 
While sexting may not pass the obscenity threshold, the state may nonetheless 
have a legitimate interest in restricting it based on the doctrine of parens patriae: the 
state’s interest in the well-being of its youth.174  Because minors have more limited 
rights than adults, the state interest required to infringe on their rights need not be as 
compelling as that required to abridge adults’ rights.175   
                                                          
 
171
 OHIO LEGIS. SERV. COMM’N, BILL ANALYSIS, H.B. 132, 128th Gen. Assemb., at 5 
(2009),  available at http://www.lsc.state.oh.us/analyses128/h0132-i-128.pdf.  
 
172
 Indeed, it would seem that the scope of the bill would extend to a photo of a teenager 
“mooning” the camera.  Rarely is mooning sexual in nature.  Rather, it is usually a form of 
expression exercised to be funny, for shock value, to taunt, or to make a political statement.  
See Cheeky Anarchists in Palace Protest, BBC NEWS (June 3, 2000), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/775725.stm (stating that the protestors in the “Moon 
Against the Monarchy” mooned the Buckingham Palace in 2000 to express their anti-
monarchy opinion); Tyler Kula, ‘Moon the Balloon’ Protest  Grows, Mayor Writes PM, THE 
OBSERVER, http://www.theobserver.ca/ArticleDisplay.aspx?e=1680060 (last visited Aug. 24, 
2010) (reporting that protestors in 2009 bared their buttocks to protest a high-tech surveillance 
balloon and camera monitoring the international border at Sarnia, Michigan).  
 
173
 See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text. 
 
174
 Stacey Hiller, The Problem with Juvenile Sex Offender Registration: The Detrimental 
Effects of Public Disclosure, 7 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 271, 284 (1998) (discussing that the 
philosophy behind parens patriae is “for the state to act in the best interest of the child”). 
 
175
 See Gere v. Stanley, 320 F. Supp. 852, 855 (M.D. Pa. 1970), aff’d, 453 F.2d 205 (3d 
Cir. 1971) (“[T]he [s]tate has an independent interest in the well-being of its youth, and its 
power to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over 
adults.” (citation omitted)). 
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1.  Sexual Conduct 
Though not addressed in the H.B. 132 proposal, one of the driving forces behind 
the legislation may be the state’s attempt to rein in teen sexuality, or more precisely, 
teens’ impetuous digital exhibition of their sexuality.  In announcing the 
implementation of a diversion program aimed to address the “widespread problem” 
of teens sexting,176 prosecutor Mathias Heck, Jr., of Montgomery County, Ohio, 
stated that sexting “in some cases [is] a result of our teens not understanding 
appropriate sexual boundaries.”177  Similarly, the aim of H.B. 132 may be to prevent 
harm to children’s ethical and psychological development by trying to shield them 
from forms of sexual expression that fall short of obscenity.  Such restrictions with 
regard to sexual conduct of teens have been upheld in courts before.178  
Curbing teen sexual activity in Ohio, however, simply does not pass muster 
under a compelling state interest standard.  If sexual conduct were the issue, would it 
not make more sense to directly restrict the actual sexual intercourse between teens?  
Yet, teenagers in Ohio are legally entitled to engage in sexual conduct.179  Ohio 
prohibits sexual conduct with a minor younger than thirteen,180 and prohibits adults 
from having sexual conduct with a minor who is between thirteen and fifteen years 
old.181  These statutes reinforce the belief that the power dynamic in a relationship 
where there is a large age difference between an adult and a minor facilitates child 
exploitation and abuse.182  On the other hand, these laws create a “Romeo and Juliet” 
exception to the statutory rape law, permitting sexual conduct between teens ages 
thirteen to seventeen.183  Because Ohio does not prohibit mutual teen sexual 
intercourse, it is difficult to justify a prohibition on sexually-charged conduct that is 
less severe, like taking nude photos, as a compelling state interest. 
2.  Harmful Nonconsensual Sexting 
A more plausible compelling interest for justifying H.B. 132 is that Ohio is 
invoking its authority under parens patriae to regulate sexting in order to protect 
minors from the harms that result from nonconsensual sexting.  As discussed above, 
                                                          
 
176
 Press Release, Montgomery Cnty. Prosecutor’s Office, supra note 100.  
 
177
 Id. 
 
178
 In Florida, for example, minors do not have any right to engage in consensual sexual 
intercourse under the privacy amendment of the state constitution.  State v. B.B., 637 So. 2d 
936, 936 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); see also Jones v. State, 640 So. 2d 1084, 1086 (Fla. 1994) 
(holding that the right to be alone in matters relating to adults’ marriage, contraception, and 
abortion does not apply to the state’s right to regulate the sexual conduct of children). 
 
179
 See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
 
180
 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02 (West 2010).  
 
181
 Id. § 2907.04.   
 
182
 See discussion supra Part IV.B.1. 
 
183
  Most states have created statutory rape exceptions commonly known as “Romeo and 
Juliet” laws that cover consensual adolescent sexual activity involving an adolescent below 
the age of consent when the sexual partner is another adolescent close in age.  Michael J. 
Higdon, Queer Teens and Legislative Bullies: The Cruel and Invidious Discrimination Behind 
Heterosexist Statutory Rape Laws, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 195, 198 (2008). 
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though consensual sexting in and of itself might not be harmful, its nonconsensual 
counterpart leads to substantial harm.184  In one sexting case, the court expressed that 
“the reasonable expectation that the material will ultimately be disseminated is by 
itself a compelling state interest for preventing the production of this material.”185  
The court went on to say that the state has a compelling interest “to protect 
minors . . . from their own lack of judgment. . . . Appellant was simply too young to 
make an intelligent decision about engaging in sexual conduct and memorializing 
it.”186  In other words, the high probability that images created and exchanged 
privately between two teens will be later dispersed throughout the community via 
nonconsensual sexting may, in and of itself, be reason enough to prohibit sexting in 
an attempt to protect minors from their lack of foresight. 
3.  Restricting Speech Disruptive to Education System 
Another justification for restricting non-obscene, non-child pornographic 
expression of teens is that the state has a compelling interest in maintaining order 
and discipline in its educational institutions.187  It is well settled that students do not 
“shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the 
schoolhouse gate.”188  However, students’ free speech rights are not unfettered.  In 
the school context, courts conduct a balancing test between students’ interest in free 
speech and the state’s interest in preserving control, order, and an educational 
environment conducive to learning.189  In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School District, the Supreme Court held that a student’s conduct or 
speech, whether in class or out, may be restricted when it either causes a substantial 
disruption of or material interference with school activities, or causes a disturbance 
or disorder on the school premises.190   
It is unclear whether the Tinker standard can extend beyond school boundaries.191  
The United States Supreme Court cases upholding Tinker have all involved conduct 
that occurs on school grounds or during school-sponsored events.192  Such an 
                                                          
 
184
 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 
185
 A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234, 238 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).  
 
186
 Id. at 238-39. 
 
187
 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985) (stating that in determining whether a 
search of a student by a school administrator was reasonable, “[a]gainst the child’s interest in 
privacy must be set the substantial interest of teachers and administrators in maintaining 
discipline in the classroom and on school grounds”). 
 
188
 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
 
189
 Id. at 507. 
 
190
 Id. at 512-13.  In Tinker, the school prohibited student activists from wearing armbands 
as an expression of their opposition against American involvement in the Vietnam War.  Id. at 
504-05.  The Court held that this prohibition was an unjustified infringement on the students’ 
First Amendment rights because the speech did not cause a material disruption or interference 
with school activities, nor did it cause a disturbance in school.  Id. at 514. 
 
191
 Kevin Turbert, Faceless Bullies: Legislative and Judicial Responses to Cyberbullying, 
33 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 651, 671 (2009). 
 
192
 Id. (discussing how the U.S. Supreme cases following Tinker all involved conduct 
and/or speech that occurred on school grounds or during school-sponsored events); see, e.g., 
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expansion, which would allow schools and courts to regulate minors’ speech that is 
completely unrelated to and occurs beyond school grounds, is at the heart of the 
cyberbullying debate.193  Though the Supreme Court has not yet laid out a clear 
guideline, a look at how lower courts have handled off-campus speech, including 
Internet speech, provides insight as to how this issue may be resolved.194    
The Second Circuit, for example, found that a school’s restriction on students’ 
off-campus newspaper violated their right to free speech because the speech 
occurred in “the general public where freedom of speech is at its ‘zenith.’”195  On the 
other hand, the court in J.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District held that a school’s 
restriction on a student’s speech on a website was justified.196  The court found that 
the website constituted on-campus speech because the student used school 
computers to access it and show it to his friends, and that it substantially disrupted 
school activities by forcing a math teacher to take a leave of absence.197  
The courts in both of these cases stated in dicta that they would not rule out that 
purely off-campus speech could be regulated if the Tinker standard was met.198  
Purely off-campus speech did meet the Tinker standard in Wisniewski v. Board of 
Education of the Weedsport Central School District.199  In that case, a student was 
suspended from school for one semester because his AOL Instant Messaging icon 
depicted a gun shooting at a person’s head, with the words “Kill Mr. VanderMolen,” 
beneath, which was the name of his English teacher, beneath.200  Even though the 
student’s use of the icon was entirely off-campus, the court concluded that it was not 
protected speech because it was reasonably foreseeable that it “would come to the 
attention of school authorities and that it would ‘materially and substantially disrupt 
the work and 
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discipline of the school.’”201 
Based on the application of the Tinker standard in lower courts, it appears that 
even completely off-campus Internet speech may be restricted if it causes a 
substantial disruption in schools.  This standard logically may be extended to 
expression in the form of sexting.  Jessica Logan’s story is a prime example of how 
sexting that occurred off-campus, in the privacy of Jessica’s home, had repercussions 
that spilled over into the school realm.  The taunting, name-calling, and harassment 
that Jessica endured in the wake of her ex-boyfriend’s decision to forward her nude 
photos to classmates occurred on school grounds.202  As a result, Jessica started 
skipping school.203  By directly causing the harassment in school, which in turn 
prevented Jessica from going to school, sexting resulted in an “a la Tinker” 
substantial disruption of school activities.204  Because much of sexting-related 
bullying (whether cyber or face-to-face) carries over onto school grounds, it is 
foreseeable that sexting may substantively disrupt the educational environment.   
Though Tinker and its progeny all deal with the authority of schools to impose 
restrictions on students’ speech, it seems that a similar compelling state interest may 
be used to justify a legislative limitation on minors’ free speech.  Thus, a 
justification for enacting H.B. 132 may be that it will be in furtherance of a 
legitimate state interest in preventing a substantive disruption in schools. 
VI.  POSSIBLE CHALLENGES TO H.B. 132 
Though taking sexting out of the felony realm is a step in the right direction, and 
prohibiting sexting may be justified by several compelling state interests, H.B. 132 
may nonetheless face challenges ahead.  One possible criticism is that the bill’s 
overly broad scope is an unconstitutional restriction on teens’ freedom of expression.  
Another is that it is an unconstitutional infringement on parents’ Fourteenth 
Amendment right to raise their children.   
A.  Unconstitutional Restriction on Teens’ First Amendment Rights 
The well-established standard with regard to the government regulating the 
content of constitutionally protected speech is that it may do so “in order to promote 
a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated 
interest.”205  In determining whether such regulation is constitutional, the United 
States Supreme Court sometimes requires that the law be “‘narrowly tailored’ to 
serve the government’s interest.”206  Both the “narrowly tailored” and “least 
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restrictive means” requirements ensure that government regulations do not restrict 
speech more than is necessary to attain the intended government interest.207   
As a censor on teens’ constitutionally protected freedom of expression, H.B. 132 
should be analyzed under the strict scrutiny analysis outlined above, which 
“invalidates a law unless it serves a ‘compelling’ governmental interest and uses the 
‘least speech-restrictive means’ to further that interest.”208  As discussed above, there 
is a compelling state interest in protecting minors by curtailing conduct that will 
likely cause them harm.   There is also a legitimate government interest in preventing 
the disruption in schools that are likely to result when nude images of students are 
forwarded to other students without the consent of the persons depicted in the 
images.  However, it is unclear whether these interests can justify a prohibition on all 
forms of sexting, as the harm that gives rise to the compelling interests only occurs 
in the context of nonconsensual sexting. 
A teen taking a nude photo of herself and sending it to a significant other as 
sexual expression is harmless if kept private between the original participants.  
Indeed, the only articulable harm that arises from this form of sexting occurs when 
the participants are caught and subsequently charged with criminal violations.  On 
the other hand, nonconsensual sexting creates substantive harm to both the minors 
involved as well as to society as a whole.  The two forms of sexting are 
distinguishable with exponentially different consequences.  Nonetheless, H.B. 132 
fails to make this distinction, and instead proposes to criminalize all forms of 
sexting.  Based on the high probability that consensual sexting will turn into 
nonconsensual sexting, the bill aims to stop the former so that the latter never comes 
into being.   
Preventing the nonconsensual form of sexting and its harms from occurring may 
very well constitute a legitimate state interest.  However, doing so with H.B. 132 
would be unconstitutional because its restriction on minors’ First Amendment rights 
is not narrowly tailored.  The compelling state interest of protecting minors from the 
harms associated with sexting may be successfully reached by prosecuting only 
those teens who forward nude images without consent.  Systematic prosecution 
limited to this scenario would deter this harmful form of sexting to no lesser degree 
than would prosecuting all forms of sexting.  At the same time, by limiting the 
prohibition to nonconsensual sexting, teens’ right to private, non-obscene, and 
harmless expression would be left unscathed.  Because H.B. 132 is not narrowly 
constructed to meet the compelling state interest in the least restrictive means, it does 
not survive constitutional scrutiny. 
B.  Unconstitutional Infringement on Parental Right to Raise Children 
A second challenge to H.B. 132 is that it infringes on parents’ due process rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment to raise their children free from governmental 
interference.209  Indeed, “‘the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of 
their children . . . is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized 
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by’ the Supreme Court.”210  The “liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause 
includes the right of parents to “‘establish a home and bring up children’” and “‘to 
control the education of their own.’”211   
A state’s interest in maintaining order by criminal law sanctions may conflict 
with the parental right to control the upbringing of their children.212  As illustrated in 
Miller v. Skumanick, some parents will adamantly fight against the state imposing 
criminal sanctions against their children for conduct that falls outside of child 
pornography.213  Undoubtedly, no parent would be pleased to find out that his or her 
child was sexting, but such a parent could choose to deal with this problem outside 
of criminal proceedings, perhaps by educating the child on why the conduct was 
improper or by punishing the child in a way that the parent finds appropriate.  On 
occasion, “legislators, responding to a strident minority . . . , enact laws that go 
beyond what most parents want.”214  H.B. 132 may be an example of this.  Imposing 
a law that in essence circumvents parental rights will likely be challenged as 
unconstitutional.   
Early United States Supreme Court cases did not protect parental rights with 
strict scrutiny.  Rather, the Court upheld restrictions on these rights if they satisfied 
the rational basis test.215  Recently, some courts have applied a strict scrutiny 
analysis to parental rights cases, though it is still unclear which standard is to be 
applied to these cases.216  Because the parental right to raise children is deemed a 
fundamental constitutional right,217 applying a strict scrutiny analysis is 
appropriate.218  Under this analysis, a restriction on a constitutional right is only 
                                                          
 
210
 Id. at 643-44 (omission in original) (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 
(2000)); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (“[The] primary role of the 
parents in the upbringing of their children is now established . . . as an enduring American 
tradition.”). 
 
211
 Miller, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 644 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)). 
 
212
 Press Release, Federal Const. Ct., Father’s Exclusion from Son’s Trial in Juvenile Court 
Proceedings (Jan. 16, 2003), available at http://archiv.jura.uni-saarland.de/lawweb/press 
releases/exclusionfromtrial.html. 
 
213
 See Miller, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 640. 
 
214
 Garfield, supra note 205, at 618. 
 
215
 Michael P. Farris, The Confused Character of Parental Rights in the Aftermath of 
Troxel, presentation at a Patrick Henry College conference: Parental Rights in the 21st 
Century―Where We Are Now, and Where We Are Headed (Feb. 20, 2009) (citing Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1928); Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)), available at http://parentalrights.org (search 
“parentalrights.org” for “aftermath of Troxel”; then follow “The Confused Character of 
Parental Rights in the Aftermath of Troxel” hyperlink). 
 
216
 Id. (discussing results of a review of every reported state and federal decision on the 
topic to “illustrate the confusion that currently prevails in parental rights cases”). 
 
217
 See supra note 210 and accompanying text. 
 
218
 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 80 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also 16A AM. 
JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 403 (2010). 
30https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol58/iss3/7
2010] ABRIDGING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 715 
 
justified if it serves a compelling state interest and if it is narrowly tailored to attain 
that interest in the least restrictive means possible.219 
If H.B. 132 is challenged under the Fourteenth Amendment, the state may point 
to its compelling interest of protecting minors from the harms of sexting.  In 
considering the well-being of minors, courts may find the new law justifiable as a 
form of “parental support” in protecting children.220  In determining whether this 
legislative support is valid, however, courts would have to consider whether parents 
actually need it.221  As one author recently wrote, “the state should not be permitted 
to censor [the sexually expressive] speech [of minors] if parents, without state 
censorship, could protect their children by monitoring them [adequately].”222    
Though the argument often proceeds that teens today are too tech-savvy for their 
parents to know what they are doing,223 the truth of the matter is that, when it comes 
to sexting, parents have many tools at their disposal to prevent their children from 
participating in it.  For example, parents may limit the number of text messages 
allowed per month on their child’s cell phone.224  They may also set up features 
inhibiting the use of the child’s cell phone during set time periods, such as late at 
night or on weekends.225  Parents may even have their cell phone service providers 
completely block the transmission of images onto their children’s phones.226  Thus, it 
appears that parents are capable of significantly, if not totally, preventing their 
children from engaging in cell phone sexting.   
The ability of parents to thwart sexting without legislative interference means 
that H.B. 132 is an unnecessary restriction on parents’ constitutional right to control 
the upbringing and control of their children.  Because the state interest justifying 
H.B. 132 can be achieved with less restrictive means, the bill does not survive the 
strict scrutiny test. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Although felony charges under child pornography laws may be appropriate when 
applied to sexual predators and pedophiles who attempt to contact children via cell 
phones, they are inapposite to sexting between adolescents.  Based on the language 
of the statutes and their current interpretations, most sexting incidents fall outside of 
the scope of federal and Ohio child pornography laws.  Those that do not should not 
to be prosecuted under such harsh laws for policy reasons.  The key purpose of 
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enacting child pornography laws was to protect children from the abuse and 
exploitation that is an inherent part of the child pornography market.  So long as 
sexting between teens is consensual and private, it constitutes neither child 
exploitation nor child abuse, as the sexual conduct depicted is voluntary and lawful 
in Ohio and the teens involved are not commercially exploited.  
Under Ohio’s proposed legislation, prosecutors would have a non-felony option 
for punishing sexting.  As a misdemeanor offense, sexting would likely be 
prosecuted more systematically, thereby creating a strong deterrent for teens to 
impulsively engage in this conduct. 227  Certainly, if the criminal system is to be used 
to eradicate the practice of sexting, doing so under the parameters of H.B. 132 is a 
step in the right direction.  Nevertheless, in determining whether to pass the bill, 
Ohio’s legislature will have to establish what the state’s interests are in enacting the 
sexting statute.   
Even if sufficient state interests are established, the proposed legislation is likely 
to be challenged because of its broad scope.  The language of the bill encompasses 
simple nudity of teens; it does not require that the nudity “appeal to a prurient 
interest” or that the images depict the genitals or pubic area.  By prohibiting non-
obscene and non-child pornographic images, H.B. 132 proposes to restrict a 
constitutionally protected form of teens’ freedom of expression. As freedom of 
expression is a fundamental right, the bill should be narrowly constructed to restrict 
this right in the least possible way while furthering the intended state interest.228  
Thus, the scope of H.B.132 should be limited to encompass only nonconsensual 
sexting, as this limitation would still successfully deter the form of sexting that 
causes harm to its participants and society, while allowing teens to maintain their 
freedom of expression with regard to non-harmful consensual sexting.   
Moreover, H.B. 132 will likely be challenged under the Fourteenth Amendment 
for infringing upon parental rights to raise children.  Because parental right cases 
implicate a fundamental constitutional right, a strict scrutiny analysis should be 
applied in determining the validity of the law.  Because parents may be able to 
successfully hinder the practice of sexting without legislative interference, imposing 
criminal sanctions on teens for sexting may be an unnecessary government intrusion 
into parental rights.  Seeing that the compelling state interests justifying H.B. 132 
may be achieved without imposing legislative restrictions on parents’ right to raise 
their children, the bill fails to meet the strict scrutiny test.   
 Ohio’s proposed legislation attempts to take the bite out of prosecuting teenagers 
for sexting by giving prosecutors a non-felony option for punishing it.  While this is 
a step in the right direction―as most sexting instances do not fit into the parameters 
of child pornography statutes, and those that do should not be prosecuted under those 
laws for policy reasons―the bill veers off-course with its overly broad scope.  As 
this Note illustrates, the substantial harms that are associated with sexting result 
from situations in which the images are distributed without the consent of the 
                                                          
 
227
 OHIO LEGIS. SERV. COMM’N, FISCAL NOTE & LOCAL IMPACT STATEMENT, H.B. 132, 
128th Gen. Assemb., at 3-4 (2009), available at http://www.lbo.state.oh.us/fiscal/fiscalnotes/1 
28ga/pdfs/hb0132in.pdf (stating that prosecutors who were previously hesitant about charging 
teens with felony violations for sexting may be more likely to prosecute teens under the more 
appropriate misdemeanor charges, and that an aggressive enforcement of this prohibition 
could have a chilling effect on sexting).  
 
228
 See discussion supra Part VI.A. 
32https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol58/iss3/7
2010] ABRIDGING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 717 
 
individuals depicted.  Accordingly, Ohio’s legislature should focus on addressing 
and criminalizing this harmful, nonconsensual sexting, rather than grouping all 
sexting into one category, thereby infringing on the First Amendment rights of teens 
and the Fourteenth Amendment rights of their parents. 
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